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 Este trabajo propone un análisis de las diferencias de eficiencia entre las pequeñas y medianas (Pymes) empresas familiares 
frente a las no familiares. Las particularidades financieras y 
organizativas de este tipo de organizaciones han sido discutidas, 
principalmente, a través de la Teoría de Agencia y la de Costes 
de Transacción. Debido a la importancia que la variable tamaño 
tiene sobre estos dos tipos de organizaciones, se ha considerado 
necesario estratificar la muestra a través de esta variable. De 
igual forma, las singularidades en la eficiencia de las empresas 
familiares son analizadas por sectores de actividad. Sin embargo, 
y contrariamente a lo que se podía esperar, no hubo diferencias 
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 This paper proposes an analysis of efficiency differences between family and non family controlled SME’s. The financial 
and organisational peculiarities of this kind of firms are 
discussed, drawing on Agency and Transaction Costs theories. 
Due to the empirically demonstrated importance of size in the 
differentiation between these two types of organisations, the 
paper distinguishes between different size segments, in terms of 
number of employees. Similarly, the singularities in the 
efficiency of family companies are analysed by distinguishing 
between sectors of activity. Contrary to what could be expected, 
no differences in the efficiency of family owned SME’s were 
found. Academic and professional implications of this result are 
discussed in the last section of the paper. 
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Family owned firms are the most common 
form of business organisation, and they play a 
vital role in contemporary economies. 
Nevertheless, most existing studies use large 
companies as the sample. In this context studies 
that explicitly investigate the influence of 
family ownership on the performance of small 
and medium sized enterprises remain sparse   
(McCann III, León and Halley Jr., 2001; 
McConaughy, Matthews and Fialko, 2001; Lee, 
2004; Chu, 2009). Several authors have 
indicated the need to make a more thorough 
analysis of the strategic and competitive 
characteristics of small and medium family 
firms, as well as the factors that condition them 
in both financial and economic terms (Westhead 
and Cowling, 1996 and 1997; Scholes, Wright, 
Westhead and Bruining, 2010). Authors as Stoy 
(1992), Binder (1994) or Schulze et al. (2001) 
have firmly encouraged comparative research as 
the best way to identify their distinctive 
features. The empirical analysis presented by 
Lee (2004) represents an interesting 
contribution in this sense. Comparing financial 
and operational performance between family 
and non-family firms, he reached the conclusion 
that family ownership and management has a 
positive influence, enhancing cost efficiency 
and return on investments. This was confirmed 
in so far as large firms, but as Lee (2004) 
himself pointed out “the question of whether 
families also enhance the relative performance 
of small businesses should be an interesting 
topic for future research”. 
In light of this, our paper proposes an 
analysis of efficiency differences between 
SME’s family and non family controlled 
SME’s. To do so, we draw on previous 
theoretical research on family firms, to discuss 
the financial and organisational peculiarities of 
this kind of firm (Westhead and Cowling, 1997; 
McConaughy, Walker, Henderson and Mishra, 
1998, McConaughy et al. 2001; Anderson y 
Reeb, 2003). Due to the empirically-
demonstrated importance of size in the 
differentiation between these two types of 
organisations (Daily and Dollinger, 1991; 
Westhead and Cowling, 1998; Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003), we will distinguish between 
different size segments, in terms of number of 
employees. Similarly, the singularities in the 
efficiency of family companies will also be 
analysed by distinguishing between sectors of 
activity. 
This paper is structured as follows. First, the 
literature in family business performance is 
reviewed and the possible explanations for the 
conflicting results are discussed. This is 
followed by the research methods, where the 
sample, data collection and the measure are also 
introduced. The next section is devoted to the 
presentation of results. Finally, the article ends 
with the conclusion, discussion and future 
development of this study. 
 
2. Concept of family firm 
Previous to the empirical analysis, it is 
necessary to clarify what we understand by 
family firm. Although there is no general 
consensus in the literature with regard to their 
conceptualisation (Handler, 1989; Westhead and 
Cowling, 1996 and 1997; Neubauer and Lank, 
1998), the different definitions that scholars 
have proposed can be grouped, following 
Handler (1989), into three widely used 
definition criteria. First, there is a large number 
of works that define family firms as those 
organisations the majority of whose stock 
belongs to the members of one family 
(Donckels and Fröhlich, 1991). Other authors, 
on the contrary have preferred to take a more 
subjective point of view linked to the perception 
of the business as a “family business” (Gasson, 
Crow, Errigton, Hutson, Marsden and Winter, 
1988). Thirdly, the family business has also 
been  conceptualised according to who really is 
in control, taking into account the extent to 
which management of the business is in the 
hands of the members of a single family (Daily 
and Dollinger, 1992). In this work, the concept 
of what constitutes a family business is based on 
a single criterion. Following Donckels and 
Fröhlich (1991) we have opted for the 
ownership structure as the distinguishing 
criterion that allows for a wide, more objective 
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discrimination than that proposed by Gasson et 
al. (1988). 
 
3. The efficiency of family owned SMEs 
Although the effects of ownership structure 
on business dynamics has attracted academic 
attention, little has been said about the influence 
of SME’s family participation (Harvey, 1999; 
McConaughy et al., 2001, Dyer, 2006). From 
this perspective, differences between family and 
non-family businesses have been analysed in 
terms of behaviour and level of 
professionalisation (Daily and Dollinger, 1992). 
However, it is more difficult to find works that 
contrast the impact of this type of ownership 
structure upon the level of efficiency 
(Brockhaus, 1994; Dyer and Handler, 1994; 
Reynolds, 1995), and when works do indeed 
contrast the above impact, normally the samples 
used are restricted exclusively to companies that 
are quoted on the stock market (Stoy, 1992). 
Two complementary theoretical frameworks 
have been traditionally applied to explain the 
impact of the business’ ownership structure 
upon levels of profitability and efficiency: the 
Agency Theory and the Transaction Costs 
Theory (McConaughy et al., 1998 and 2001). 
These two approaches share the basic view of 
a business as a set of contracts that can be 
formally designed to reinforce efficiency, or 
implicitly established through informal 
relationships (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 
1986; Eisenhardt, 1989; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1989; Agrawal and Knoebel, 1996; Dyer, 2006). 
The Agency Theory argues that business 
efficiency is achieved through establishing 
efficient contracts between the two subjects 
involved in what are termed agency 
relationships: (1) the principal, who 
commissions the work and (2) the agent, who 
carries it out (Eisenhardt, 1989). Such contracts 
are necessary because of the very characteristics 
of the interaction between the principal and the 
agent, which takes place in a situation of limited 
rationality and knowledge asymmetry. 
Sometimes these conditions give rise to 
opportunistic behaviours, motivated not by 
common goals but by individual interests. 
Agency contracts are established precisely to 
regulate the above relationships and their 
objective is therefore to palliate the problems 
arising from the differences in risk aversion 
between the principal and the agent, their 
conflicts of interest and the control of the 
former over the results of the latter’s work 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In order to design these governing structures, 
the Theory of Transaction Costs explores the 
costs associated with the relationships of 
internal exchange existing between the 
individuals that take part in the organisation, 
analysing how they can minimise the problems 
related to limited rationality and the conflict of 
interests between the principal and the agent 
through the establishment of both implicit and 
explicit contracts (Barringer and Milkovich, 
1998). 
From what has just been said it follows that 
problems arising from limited rationality and 
the lack of alignment of interests that might 
affect business efficiency will fundamentally 
occur when there is a clear separation between 
ownership of the business and its control (Fama, 
1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1986). 
Applying this logic to the particular situation 
of family businesses has led many authors to 
conclude that this type of organisation should 
present relatively higher levels of efficiency 
justified by the blurring of the roles of principal 
and agent, fundamentally in those small family 
listed that are not quoted on the stock market 
(Stoy, 1992; Chu, 2009). 
Basic propositions of the Agency Theory 
such as those advanced by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) reach the 
same conclusion, arguing that in family 
businesses the costs in terms of conflicts of 
interest should be smaller, as should the level of 
opportunist agent behaviour with respect to the 
principal, leading therefore to higher ratios of 
efficiency (Aronoff and Ward, 1995; Daily and 
Dollinger, 1992). 
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Nevertheless, other empirical studies have 
reached contradictory results. There is another 
large group of authors who propose a relatively 
smaller efficiency within family businesses 
(Weasthead and Cowling, 1997), and criticise 
three underlying suppositions present in works 
previously mentioned. Firstly, Alchian and 
Woodward (1988) have questioned the fact that 
the union of ownership and control eliminate 
agency problems or that these problems are 
solved efficiently when the roles of principal 
and agent are blurred. Therefore relationship 
control mechanisms do not turn out to be 
unnecessary in family businesses as Schulze, 
Lubatkin and Dino (2003) demonstrated when 
they verified that the use of performance-based 
incentives are not less used in this type of 
organisation. 
Moreover, the opinion that family 
relationships cancel out conflicts of interest and 
information asymmetry has also been subject of 
criticism. Although it has been pointed out that 
personal conflict might be moderated by close 
family ties, the empirical evidence shows that 
this characteristic does not lessen conflicts that 
are more task-related, which are directly linked 
to efficiency (Beehr, Drexler and Faulkner, 
1997; Davis and Harveston, 2001; Vilaseca, 
2002; Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino, 2003b). 
Therefore, and assuming the conflict 
typology advanced by De Dreu and Weingart 
2003), we can state that the family nature of a 
firm has a positive impact upon the degree of 
“personal conflict”, but not upon what is termed 
“task conflict”. Finally, authors such as Gasson 
et al. (1988), Goffee (1996) and Westhead and 
Cowling (1997) have also criticised the implicit 
assumption in many earlier works that profit 
maximisation is the main objective of family 
firms. 
As demonstrated earlier, and taking the 
Agency theory as our point of departure, many 
authors have deduced that efficiency in non-
family firms can be affected negatively by the 
fact that those responsible for managing the 
organisation are motivated by utility functions 
other than profit maximisation, this latter being 
the owners’ priority. 
However, this argument cannot be 
transferred as a counterpoint to family 
companies to argue that when the principal and 
agent is one and the same, profit maximisation 
is the main driving force behind the business’ 
behaviour (Westhead and Cowling, 1997). 
In this regard, Donckels and Fröhlich (1991) 
verified that the directors of family firms place 
as their main objectives aspects as the survival 
of the business and their financial independence, 
which are ranked higher than the traditional 
aims of non-family businesses (growth, higher 
performance and financial profitability). 
Continuing this line of reasoning, Daily and 
Dollinger (1992) demonstrated that there was a 
greater reluctance towards growth in family 
businesses, a fact that might be explained by the 
owners’ fear of the family losing control of the 
organisation and a greater preference for 
stability (Binder, 1994; Ng and Keasey, 2010). 
The importance given to this set of non-
financial objectives means that family firms are 
prepared to sacrifice present efficiency in favour 
of continuity or the guaranteed transmission of 
the business to future generation (Hay and 
Morris, 1984). 
Based on the previously established, our 
proposal is: 
H.1.: Family firms show higher levels of 
efficiency, in terms of economic and financial 
profitability and higher margins than non-family 
companies. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Sample 
The initial sample consisted of 816 Spanish 
SME’s (firms with less than 250 employees). 
The proportional fixation sampling procedure 
used, and the fact that they were randomly 
chosen from the SABI database (Iberian 
Balance Sheet Analysis System) ensured that 
the sample was representative of the Spanish 
business population for a confidence interval of  
95 percent, not only as a whole but also in the 
different segments of sector and size considered 
(table 1). 
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The data necessary for the analysis were 
extracted via a questionnaire addressed to the 
company’s manager that included items 
designed to identify the family nature of the 
business and describe its main structural 
organisational and strategic characteristics. The 
financial information was extracted directly 
from the SABI database that gathers complete 
annual financial accounts as another as other 
that was used to evaluate company’s efficiency. 
Table 1 











- 10 employees 28 80 108 
11-50 employees 45 92 137 Industry 
51 - 249 employees 30 69 99 
- 10 employees 28 42 70 
11-50 employees 24 66 90 Building 
51 - 249 employees 13 43 56 
- 10 employees 29 48 77 
11-50 employees 29 81 110 Services 
51 - 249 employees 23 46 69 
Total 249 567 816 
1 Error in each segment (Sector-Size): 10% 
2 Maximum global error in the worst case (p=q=1/2): 14,7% 
 
 
To explore the relationship between the 
family nature of a business and its efficiency, 
considering the lack of consensus in previous 
empirical research, we analyse if differences do 
really exist, applying Pearson’s χ2 test and 
ANOVA. 
The strength and direction of this relationship 
will be explored through Kendall’s Tau statistic. 
In order to capture differences in efficiency, and 
following the recommendations of Stoy (1992) 
and Westhead and Cowling (1997) of not basing 
this type of study on uni-dimensional 
measurements of performance, three different 
variables will be used. 
4.2. Variables 
Those organisations with a participation of 
more than 50 percent by a family group have 
been considered to be family firms. Moreover, 
in order to incorporate the efficiency variable, 
we have followed the criterion of using profit-
related measurements (Akhigbe and McNulty, 
2005), a procedure that enjoys a wide consensus 
in literature. In this manner we aim to reflect the 
business’ capacity to generate results based on 
the correct application of a series of resources to 
the business activity. 
Thus defined, profitability is an essential 
variable for the long-term survival of the 
organisation that directly determines its 
competitive capacity. Following Stoy (1992) 
and Westhead and Cowling’s (1997) proposal, 
we have decided against using a single 
measurement of efficiency with the aim of 
capturing real differences in performance and 
not simply “contextual” or “sample” ones 
(Westhead and Cowling, 1997: p. 31). Thus, and 
in order to capture all of the possible variability 
in efficiency within the sample businesses, three 
dimensions of profitability have been taken into 
consideration1: 
- Economic Profitability or Investment 
Profitability, measuring a business’ productive 
efficiency. This variable relates a concept of 
results before interest with the total capital used 
without taking into account financing or the 
origin of capital (owned or borrowed). From an 
economic point of view, it represents the 
performance of the totality of the business’s 
investment;  
Economic Profitability = (Earning before 
interests and after taxes / Total Assets) * 100 
- Financial Profitability: contrasting a 
concept of business’ results (normally yearly 
results before or after taxes) with shareholder 
equity. In other words it is the rate at which the 
business’ shareholder equity is remunerated. 
Financial Profitability = (Earning Results 
for the financial year / Stakeholders´Equity) * 
100 
- Operating Margin Profitability: which 
relates the operating results obtained by a 
business in a specific financial year with the 
operating income achieved in that period. 
                                                 
1 In order to measure these variables, the averages of the 
data corresponding to financial years 1999 and 2000 were 
used, these being the latest available complete data 
available from the SABI database. 
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Operating Margin Profitability = (Operating 
Results / Operating Income) * 100 
 
5. Results  
Testing the hypothesis concerning the 
relationship between the family nature of a 
business and its levels of efficiency was first 
undertaken applying Pearson’s χ2 test and 
Kendall’s Tau. 
These statistics enable us to study the link 
between ordinal variables based on the analysis 
of their contingency relationships, so it was first 
necessary to re-encode the continuous efficiency 
variables into three categories defined from the 
sample Medium (Low, Medium and High).  
The results of the tests developed indicate, 
with 90 percent reliability, that there is no type 
of significant link between family participation 
and efficiency, revealing a clear independence 
between the variables (table 2). 
This fact can be observed not only in the 
value of the significance obtained (χ2 test’s P-
Values are in all cases greater than 0.1), but also 
in the practical coincidence of the expected and 
observed frequencies in each of the cells in the 
contingency Table. Kendall’s Tau statistic, 
which might offer the idea of a possible 
Table 2 
Family participation-Efficiency relationship. 


















Tally  65 175 Low 
  
Expected 70.6 169.4 
Pearson 
χ2 Test 1.314
a 2 0.519 
Tally  40 96 
Tau-b -0.044 0.039 -1.145 0.252 
Medium 
  Expected 40.0 96.0 
Likehood 
Ratio 1.313 2 0.519 






in the last 
two years High 
  





1.311 1 0.252 
Tau-c -0.046 0.040 -1.145 0.252 
Tally  86 217 Low 
  Expected 89,1 213,9 
Pearson 
χ2 Test 0.606
b 2 0.739 
Tally  33 82 Tau-b -0.027 0.039 -0.699 0.484 Medium 
Expected 33,8 81,2 
Likehood 
Ratio 0.601 2 0.740 







in the last 
two years  High 





0.529 1 0.467 
Tau-c -0.028 0.040 -0.699 0.484 
Tally  91 220 Low 
Expected 91,5 219,5 
Pearson 
χ2 Test 0.244
c 2 0.885 
Tally  36 92 
Tau-b -0.009 0.039 -0.231 0.817 
Medium 
Expected 37,6 90,4 
Likehood 
Ratio 0.244 2 0.885 





in the last 
two years  High 





0.076 1 0.783 
Tau-c -0.009 0.040 -0.231 0.817 
a 0 cells (0.0%) have an Expected Frequency of less than 5.0, ensuring the correct use of the test. 
The minimum expected frequency is 40.00. 
b 0 cells (0.0%) have an Expected Frequency of less than 5.0. The expected minimum is 33.82. 
c 0 cells (0.0%) have an Expected Frequency of less than 5.0. The expected minimum is 37.65. 
d Assuming the alternative hypothesis. 
e Using the asymptotic standard error based on the null hypothesis. 
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correlation between these ordinal variables, 
reinforces the conclusion, as all of the 
relationships analysed turn out to be statistically 
non-significant. 
In order to check that the above results were 
not biased by the three efficiency categories 
(High, Medium and Low) that were introduced 
to make the efficiency measurements ordinal, a 
variance analysis was carried out. 
In this regard, the ANOVA procedure 
enabled us to verify that there was no type of 
Medium significant difference in the efficiency 
variables (on this occasion considered as 
continuous) between Family and Non-family 
Businesses. 
Similarly, neither were the variances of both 
groups found to be significantly different (table 
3), so also ANOVA shows that this 
organisational characteristic does not influences 
efficiency. 
Finally, and given the fact that the sample 
was representative for each sectorial stratum 
and size, the same analysis was undertaken by 
activity (industrial, construction and services) 
and number of employees (less than 10 workers, 
between 10 and 50 and more than 50 workers). 
Considering the incidence of these three 
variables, we tried to explore if family firms 
with a specific characteristic did indeed present 
significant differences in efficiency with regard 
to non-family businesses. 
As can be observed in table 4 and 5, even 
when these variables were introduced into the 
analysis, no link between the family nature of 
the businesses and their efficiency was found. 
In fact, the only statistical relationship that 
can be gained from the data can be observed in 
companies in the services sector, and this only 
when efficiency is measured through 
profitability by margin. 
However, even in this case, the relationship 
revealed by Kendall’s Tau statistic is quite weak 
and it would therefore be incorrect to deduce 
from this data that the family nature of 
businesses in the services sector determines 
their level of efficiency. 
Thus the data obtained from our sample of 
SME’s does not ratify any of the hypothesis 
derived from the Agency or Transaction Costs 
Theories. 
Table 3 
Analysis of a Factor’s Variance (Majority Family Participation). 
 
ANOVA Variance homogeneity test 
  
  
Sum of the 
squares F Significance 
Levene 
Statistic Significance 
Inter-group 1.011 1.311 0.253 .016 0.898 
Intra-group 457.248       
 
Efficiency by financial 
profitability in the last 
two years  
  
  
Total 458.259       
Inter-group 0.403 0.528 0.468 0.311 0.578 
Intra-group 452.914       
 
Efficiency by economic 
profitability in the last 
two years  
  
  
Total 453.318       
Inter-group 0.054 0.075 0.784 0.271 0.603 
Intra-group 426.568       
 
Efficiency by margin in 
the last two years 
Total 426.622       
 
REVISTA DE EMPRESA FAMILIAR, vol. 1, no. 2, Noviembre 2011 
 
Herrera Madueño, J., Larran Jorge, M. and Sánchez Gardey, G. (2011). Effects of family ownership on SME perfomance. Revista de 





Family participation-Efficiency relationship by size. 










-0.040 0.622 Up to 10 workers 
(N=148) 4.241 0.120 -0.042 0.622 
.268 .605 
-0.100 0.081 From 11 to 50 







the last two 
years  





-0.020 0.804 Up to 10 workers 
(N=148) 2.238 0.327 -0.021 0.804 
.109 .741 
-0.094 0.114 From 11 to 50 







the last two 
years  
More than 50 
workers (N=155) 1.118 0.572 0.057 0.438 
.654 .420 
-0.031 0.702 Up to 10 workers 
(N=148)  1.494 0.474 -0.031 0.702 
0.238 0.626 
-0.086 0.143 From 11 to 50 




margin in the 
last two years  
More than 50 
workers (N=155)  3.035 0.219 0.120 0.112 2.206 0.140 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have an Expected Frequency pf less than 5.0, ensuring the correct use of the test. 
 
Table 5 
Family participation-Efficiency relationship by sector of activity. 




Value a Asymptotic sig. 
Tau C 
Approx. 
Significance F Sig, 
-0.034 0.571 
Industrial (N=257) 0.341 0.843 
-0.035 0.571 
0.317 0.574 
-0.046 0.550 Construction 







the last two 
years 




Industrial (N=257) 0.326 0.850 
0.007 0.907 
0.023 0.879 
-0.102 0.188 Construction 







the last two 
years 




Industrial (N=257) 0.941 0.625 
0.057 0.346 
0.841 0.360 
0.066 0.395 Construction 




margin in the 
last two years 
Services (N=172) 6.249 0.044 -0.178 0.013 5.976 0.016 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have an Expected Frequency pf less than 5.0, ensuring the correct use of the test.	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To the contrary, the statistical analysis 
developed about the efficiency of family 
businesses validates their underlying null 
hypothesis. This confirms that “majority family 
participation” and “efficiency” are completely 
independent variables. For this reason, it cannot 
be deduced that family firms enjoy a greater 
ease in managing internal relationships or less 
transaction costs, but there is neither evidence 
that they are less efficient, as previous literature 
pointed out (Weasthead and Cowling, 1997; 
Filatotchev, Lien and Piesen, 2005). To the 
contrary data obtained from Spanish firms point 
to a third possibility: SME’s do not show 
different levels of efficiency (Castillo and 
Wakefield, 2006; Weasthead and Howorth, 
2006). 
This result does not close the analyses of 
particular aspects of efficiency within family 
businesses. It is first necessary to explore the 
same relationships in different national and 
economic contexts. 
Similarly and even considering that different 
levels of efficiency between family and non-
family businesses are not to be expected, it 
would still be interesting to study if profitability 
in each of the cases is determined by different 
factors. To do so, it would be particularly 
interesting to introduce organisational variables 
(i.e. behaviour, strategy, management 
professionalization) into the analysis, as 
potential moderators of the relationship between 
family participation and efficiency (Daily and 
Dollinger 1991; Reynolds 1995; Westhead and 
Cowling 1998; Anderson and Reeb 2003). This 
kind of analysis could help us to describe the 
singularities of family owned organisations, and 
understand the determinants of their efficiency. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
The purpose of this study sought to provide 
empirical evidence of the relationship between 
family ownership and SME’s performance.  
Although the performance implication of family 
ownership has had important attention in 
empirical studies, these tend to use large firms, 
listed or nonlisted, as the research sample. The 
relationship between family ownership and 
general performance is still unclear. While 
Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and 
Amit (2006), Lee (2006) or Martínez et al. 
(2006) argue a positive relationship between 
family ownership and performance, other 
authors establish the opposite (Weasthead and 
Cowling, 1997; Filatotchev et al., 2005). Our 
result show another possibility, according with 
Chu (2009), where we did not detect any 
significant performance differences between 
family and nonfamily firms. 
From a sample of 816 SMEs in Spain. 
Spanish Sme’s representing more 99% of the 
country’s business, of which 65%, 
approximately, are family firms. Three different 
measures of pe were used to test the differences: 
Economic, Financial and Operating Margin 
Profitability. Neither of them showed significant 
results. We conclude that family firms obtain 
similar performance non family firms ones.  
Our contribution of this study is to enhance 
the Chu’s arguments (2009), who sets the 
distinguishing characteristics between SME’s 
and large firms. 
Finally, the principal limitation in this study 
is relative to the sample. The data was collected 
in the South of Spain, therefore limiting the 
possibility of generalizing our findings. For this 
reason the next step should be conducted to 
collecting the same data in other parts of Spain 
in order to increase the external validity of our 
results. Moreover, we believe that analogous 
studies should be conducted in countries other 
than Spain to validity general results. 
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